It is a moment of historic fluidity on the Korean Peninsula, the world’s most heavily fortified zone of conflict. Kim Jong-Un, the third generation of the Kim dynasty, is fighting for his legitimacy among party and military stalwarts, and has been shuffling the ranks of his generals. To help establish himself, he plans to launch a missile in mid-December from a site in North Korea to mark the one-year anniversary of his father’s death—at roughly the same time South Korea is holding its presidential elections. Early signs that he would prove to be a Mikhail Gorbachev or Deng Xiaoping, who would dramatically reform his country’s version of Communism while mending fences with the world, appear to be fading. Kim now is trying to black out information from the rest of the world that has been reaching his population. “It’s going to get worse,” Sue Mi Terry, a former U.S. government intelligence analyst told a crowd at Club Quarters on December 3. “He’s more paranoid.”
Terry, now senior managing director of Gerson Global Advisors and a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, was one of three panelists to debate the future of North Korea’s Kim at the event. Also appearing was Hannah Song, president and chief executive officer of Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), which has brought 117 North Korean defectors out of China. She invited one of LiNK’s defectors, Danny Lee, who shocked the audience in relaying his experience of growing up in North Korea. Rounding out the panel was Stephen Noerper, a former State Department official and senior vice president of The Korea Society. The panel was moderated by Melanie Kirkpatrick, formerly of The Wall Street Journal and author of “Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story of Asia’s Underground Railroad.” She is also a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington.
The panelists generally agreed that Kim, who is in his late 20s, is fighting for his place in history. Since the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, one year ago, he has removed four out of the eight generals who were pallbearers at his father’s funeral. One way to interpret that is that the younger Kim is consolidating control, but the panelists seemed to feel it was a reflection of a struggle for power.
The reason the missile launch is so important for the younger Kim, after an unsuccessful attempt this past April, is that he needs to demonstrate to his internal audience that he has achieved something during his first year of power. Another failure could further shake his grip on power, as his family members and various generals jockey for influence. But a successful test, widely presumed to be an effort to develop the capability to deliver nuclear warheads, would send major shockwaves through the region.
One point of tension among the panelists was whether the signs of thaw in North Korean society could blossom into internal pressure for meaningful political reform. Terry was skeptical, but Noerper noted that North Korean workers are working on projects in Russia and China, some trade zones have been established and Chinese traders are bringing in cell phones that connect to the outside world. The flow of information about the rest of the world is unmistakably powerful. “You cannot undo the things the people have learned and we think that will continue to build internal pressures,” said Song.
But Terry, who was born in South Korea, remained unconvinced. Kim seems more skilled than his father when it comes to propaganda, showing off Disney characters on national television and being photographed in the presence of his wife and other women wearing miniskirts. Those are merely superficial, she argued. “True reform means opening, which means the downfall of the regime,” she said. “Show me the evidence and I’ll believe it.” The fact that the regime is trying to shut down the flow of defectors is a case in point.
Could the Kim regime simply collapse? Yes, the panelists agreed. But that could set off a major humanitarian and diplomatic crisis. It could require $3 trillion to bring the North’s economy to a level where it is self-sustaining and no one country has enough capital to pay for it; that would require cooperation among the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, but those countries have fundamentally different goals. China, for example, does not want to see a reunited Korea on its border, particularly one that possesses the North’s nuclear weapons and one that is closely aligned with the United States. “We are not as prepared as we should be,” said Song. “There has been a lot of military planning but very little talk of reconstruction.”
Another reason the North Korean situation is so fluid is that so many governments in the region are undergoing transition. An election in the South is pitting a conservative candidate, who would adopt a tougher line against Pyongyang, against a liberal candidate, who would be more conciliatory. Japan is facing elections and is seeing strong gains from the nationalistic right-wing. China has just installed President Xi Jinping, so China, which is North Korea’s largest benefactor, is also undergoing a transition. The Chinese have cautioned against a missile test, but it’s not clear Kim will listen to them. “Why would [Kim’s regime] not want to test the Chinese?” asked Noerper.